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Cost engineering and costing in Hawthorn Leslie Shipbuilders, 1886 - 1915 
 
Abstract 
 
This research examines cost engineering and costing in a British shipbuilding firm in 
the late nineteenth – early twentieth century. The firm maintained separate systems of 
contract accounting, costing and reporting for directors and employed internal data 
from these systems in performance measurement, the development of managerial 
incentives and the enforcement of managerial accountability. An apparent gap in the 
information required to manage the firm in a cyclical and highly competitive industry 
during a period of rapid organisational and technological change was filled by an 
informal and personal cost engineering system developed by the shipbuilding 
manager. The shipbuilding manager’s cost engineering system employed a wide range 
of both internal and external data for use in cost management and in cost estimation, 
pricing and tendering. Thus cost engineering and costing developed to serve different 
purposes and developed in different spheres and along different trajectories. 
 
Keywords: Contract accounting; Cost accounting; Cost engineering; Costing.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Boyns and Edwards (2007, p.994) note that ‘cost calculations have been used for 
centuries as the basis for planning, decision making and control.’ However, they 
indicate (Boyns and Edwards, 2007, p.980) that the ‘question of who were the proper 
people to operate the (cost and management accounting) function surfaced during the 
latter decades of the nineteenth century’ and they observe that ‘fighting for turf’ took 
place between engineers and accountants. Nevertheless, whilst the fact of 
engineering’s involvement in the development of costing is widely known, the precise 
nature of this involvement has not been subject to a great deal of detailed academic 
scrutiny.  
 
Those studies which examine the relationship between engineering and costing tend 
to approach the issue from the accounting perspective. For example, Hopper, Cooper, 
Lowe, and Capps (1986) found that the dominance of engineers in the National Coal 
Board was an important factor in failures to develop advanced systems of financial 
control. However, in their study of cost accounting in the shipbuilding, engineering 
and metals industries of the West of Scotland, Fleming, McKinstry and Wallace 
(2000, p.208) indicated that ‘armies of (both) estimators and clerks’ were employed in 
the production of costing information. Although Fleming et al (ibid, p.195) noted that 
an ‘engineering culture among management may . . have inhibited the development of 
costing’ they also found that the costing systems that they examined were ‘adequate’.  
 
Other research has indicated the existence of engineering-based costing as a discipline 
in its own right. McKinstry (1999) studied Albion Motors’ engineering culture, 
context and working methods and noted (p.218) the company’s use of ‘basically 
adequate (engineering) alternatives to the more modern management accounting 
techniques’ available. McLean and Tyson (2006, p.413) noted that ‘the engineering 
culture of the shipbuilding industry promoted the use of ‘alternative’, non-accounting 
measurement systems.’ However, even the latter two studies focused primarily on 
accounting-based costing (hereafter termed simply as costing) rather than on 
engineering-based costing (hereafter cost engineering).  
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Cost engineering has been neglected in studies of costing within the accounting 
history literature and the current research aims to remedy this neglect. It does so by 
conducting a detailed scrutiny of cost engineering and costing in British shipbuilding 
in the late nineteenth-early twentieth century, building upon McLean’s (2006) paper 
which is limited to a study of formal accounting systems in Hawthorn Leslie 
Shipbuilders. In conducting this scrutiny, the current paper contributes to our 
understanding of the broader history of management accounting in two major ways. 
First, it emphasises the need to account for an apparent shortfall in management 
accounting information within a particular firm. Thus, the current research confirms 
the importance of examining the systems of the individual firm in the context of work 
practices and information systems developed generally within an industry as a whole. 
Additionally, the current paper establishes the vital importance of examining informal 
information systems developed by individual managers. Second, the current research 
indicates that engineering and accounting may have acted in a complementary rather 
than a competitive manner in developing information systems within firms and 
industries.  
The current paper is based on archival research of both formal organisational systems 
and informal managerial information and is organised into six further sections dealing 
with: British shipbuilding: industry and engineering; Hawthorn Leslie Shipbuilders; 
Herbert Rowell: career and context; Hawthorn Leslie: contract accounting, costing 
and reporting for directors; Cost engineering; and Conclusions. 
 
2. British shipbuilding: industry and engineering 
 
The period of the late nineteenth - early twentieth centuries was a time of profound 
economic, social and political change (Appendix A). In Great Britain, this period was 
also the time of huge technological and industrial changes that have become known as 
the Second Industrial Revolution (Landes, 2003). In Great Britain, the ship as a 
product experienced a process of technological transformation during the mid-
nineteenth century as steam was substituted for sail, and iron and then steel replaced 
wood as the major construction material for the hull (Slaven, 1980, p.113). In this 
transformation process, metal workers replaced woodworkers as the key members of 
the labour force (McClelland and Reid, 1985) and engineers took over from 
shipwrights as the dominant professional grouping in the industry. Initially, these 
3 
 
engineers were men who rose from the ranks of tradesmen but, as ships and shipyards 
became larger and more complex, a professional engineering training became more 
important and was established as the norm in larger shipbuilding firms by the early 
twentieth century (Pollard and Robertson, 1979, p.136). 
 
Shipbuilding was a capital goods industry which experienced huge variations in 
output and was affected very adversely by economic downturns. The depression of 
the mid-1880s saw the ‘bankruptcy or reorganization of a number of well-known 
yards (and) the slow metamorphosis (of partnerships and family firms) into public 
companies’ (Pollard and Robertson, 1979, p.76). Some shipyards came under the 
control of ‘non-specialist businessmen who made up for their lack of experience in 
naval architecture by their ability to organize large masses of capital’ (Pollard and 
Robertson, 1979, p.75). Under the direction of shipbuilders and businessmen, forward 
and backward integration became fundamentals of ‘the amalgamation movement’ of 
the late nineteenth – early twentieth century (Pollard and Robertson,1979, p.96). 
Limited company status and the amalgamation movement stimulated the development 
of formal systems of accounting and financial reporting in the shipbuilding industry. 
 
In this context of complexity, uncertainty and risk engendered by industrial, 
organisational and environmental change, Great Britain became the world’s leading 
shipbuilding nation (Jones, 1957), constructing about 80 per cent of the world’s 
competitively built tonnage. British shipbuilders managed the efficient organisation of 
supplies and sought and maintained markets. Their labour-based construction methods 
and relative slowness to adopt new equipment helped to limit fixed costs, an 
important strength given the cyclical nature of the industry (McLean, 1996, pp.124-
25; Pollard and Robertson, 1979, p.6). In particular, shipbuilders on the River Clyde 
in Scotland and on the North East Coast of England exploited comparative advantages 
of skills, experience and knowledge in already developed regional engineering and 
metals industries. Thus, they established these regions as the leading sites of the 
British iron and steel shipbuilding industry (Lorenz, 1991, pp.25-26; Slaven, 1980, 
p.107). 
 
3. Hawthorn Leslie Shipbuilders  
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In examining the relationships between engineering, accounting and costing 
development the current research focuses on the shipbuilding activities of the firm of 
Hawthorn Leslie, which was situated on the River Tyne in North East England. The 
industrial and engineering context of Hawthorn Leslie has been examined in the 
previous section. In its wider contextual setting, the firm operated in a period of 
fundamental economic, social and political change (Appendix A).  
Hawthorn Leslie was formed in 1886 on the merger of the engineering partnership of 
R & W Hawthorn and the shipbuilding partnership of Andrew Leslie. It was organised 
into three ‘departments’: the Shipyard, the Engine Works and the Locomotive Works 
(Clarke, no date) (See Note 1). Hawthorn Leslie was a limited company with over 70 
per cent of its shares being owned by the founding directors who had all been owners 
of the pre-merger firms. After several changes, in 1889 the 70 per cent of the shares 
and all of the directorships of the firm became settled on six men. Five of these six 
men came from R & W Hawthorn: B.C. Browne, a mechanical and civil engineer, 
became Company Chairman; F.C. Marshall, an apprentice-trained marine engineer, 
headed the Engine Works; C.E. Straker a non-specialist businessman who had led the 
Locomotive Works for ten years continued in this role, aided by W. Cross, an 
engineer; J.H Ridley, a Cambridge graduate, was Company Secretary. Only one 
shareholder-director came from Andrew Leslie’s shipyard. Leslie was the son of a 
Shetland crofter and had served as an apprentice boilermaker in an Aberdeen iron 
works and later journeyed south to the River Tyne where he established his iron 
shipyard and managed it with such success that when he died in 1894 ‘his will was 
proved at £161,000’ (Clarke, no date, p. 33). A. Coote, the son of a wealthy, self-
made man, had served an apprenticeship at the famous Scottish shipyard of Denny & 
Co. before going into partnership with Leslie and then marrying his daughter. On the 
merger, Coote was appointed Head of the Hawthorn Leslie Shipyard. 
 
Hawthorn Leslie is regarded as one of Britain’s ‘important shipbuilders’ (Pollard and 
Robertson, 1979, p. 51) of the late nineteenth-early twentieth centuries. The shipyard 
employed over 2,500 workers in a good year and was in the vanguard of the 
technological development of ships (Clarke, no date, pp.50-52; p.67). The opening of 
the Suez Canal (Appendix A) led to an increased demand for oil tankers and for 
refrigerated vessels for the Australian and New Zealand meat trade. Increasingly 
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fraught political relationships between Russia and Japan and between Great Britain 
and Germany (Appendix A) caused an increase in demand for warships.  
 
Estimating costs and prices for such new and specialised ships proved to be a difficult 
task and the power of accounting and financial reporting was made apparent when 
Coote was held accountable and obliged to accept ‘personal losses in excess of 
£16,500’ on contracts for the first oil tankers ever built (Clarke, no date, p.50). 
Furthermore, the Company Secretary informed the Company Chairman that the 
Shipyard Department was ‘much mismanaged (and) though Coote is much anxious 
and hard-working – still we don’t pay a man £2,000 a year to make such blunders’. 
After further managerial difficulties in the shipyard, in 1891 Herbert Rowell was 
appointed as Shipyard General Manager (Clarke, no date, pp.50 – 51).  
 
4. Herbert Rowell: career and context 
 
Herbert Rowell was born in 1860. As a young man he obtained a practical training in 
shipbuilding as a premium apprentice and, later, coupled this with an education in 
naval architecture at Glasgow University (Rowell, 1996). Rowell’s career was as a 
shipbuilder and manager rather than as an accountant. However, as he was heavily 
involved in costing and cost management he may be regarded as an ‘actor’ (Yamey, 
1981, p.131) in the history of accounting. The Dictionary of Business Biography 
(Clarke, 1984a, pp.957-961) sketches Rowell’s public career, indicating his success 
and the range of his achievements. In Hawthorn Leslie he advanced from Shipyard 
General Manager to Company Director and then to Company Chairman. Additionally,  
he was the first lecturer, part-time, in naval architecture at Armstrong College, 
subsequently a college of Durham University and, later, part of Newcastle University. 
Furthermore, he was a Council member of the Institution of Naval Architects; a 
member of the Institution of Civil Engineers and President of the North East Coast 
Institution of Civil Engineers; President of the North East Coast Institution of 
Engineers and Shipbuilders; Chairman of the (River) Tyne Shipbuilders’ Association; 
President of the Shipbuilding Employers’ Federation; and Vice-President of the 
Federation of British Industry. Rowell’s success and his contribution to the business 
world were marked with the award of a knighthood before the First World War and he 
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became Sir Herbert Rowell, a man both respected and trusted within the business 
community (Browne, 1914).  
 
Of his initial appointment in the Shipyard Department Rowell (Rowell, 1996, p.98) 
wrote, 
                                
                I realised from the first the vital necessity of watching every point on the  
                commercial side and the equal necessity and more congenial task of earning 
                the confidence of shipowners, if I was ever to re-establish the business and  
                the Company which was at the time in desperately low water. 
 
The extent to which Hawthorn Leslie’s formal systems of contract accounting, costing 
and reporting for directors enabled Rowell to ‘watch’ the commercial and other 
aspects of shipyard management will be examined in the next section. 
  
5. Hawthorn Leslie: contract accounting, costing and reports for directors 
 
Hawthorn Leslie maintained separate systems of contract accounting, costing and 
reporting for directors. The double-entry contract accounting system encompassed all 
three ‘departments’ and remained essentially unchanged between 1886 and 1914 
(McLean, 2006). This system enabled the calculation of the profit or loss for each 
individual contract and, on an annual basis, for each ‘department’ and for the 
company as a whole. A company balance sheet was prepared at the year-end. In 
addition to its financial accounting and reporting functions, this contract accounting 
system also acted as a database for a memorandum (i.e. non-double-entry) costing 
system and for a system of reporting for directors. Hawthorn Leslie’s memorandum 
costing system also remained essentially unchanged between 1886 and 1914. In the   
costing system, data were extracted from the contract accounting system and were 
used to prepare cost schedules for each ship, engine and locomotive during, and on 
completion of, the construction process. In 1897, Hawthorn Leslie instituted a formal 
system of monthly Reports for Directors’ Meetings, consequent upon the appointment 
of a new Company Secretary and a series of changes in directorships.  
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Together, these systems of contract accounting, costing and reporting were used, inter 
alia, to develop incentives for the firm’s senior managers and to hold these managers  
accountable. In the negotiation of his personal contract with Hawthorn Leslie in 1892, 
Rowell ‘agreed to a salary of £800 per year plus 2% of the shipyard profits for two 
years, and thereafter 4%’ (Clarke, no date, p.51). In the enforcement of accountability, 
Rowell’s predecessor as Head of the Shipyard had been obliged to accept personal 
liability for losses on contracts (Clarke, no date, p.50) and in 1895 Cross was 
dismissed from the Locomotive Works on incurring losses of £8,395 on a contract 
with Ceylon Railways (Clarke, no date, p.56).  
 
While Rowell accepted the use of ‘departmental’ profit as an overall, macro-level 
measure of performance it is apparent that he was less content with the use cost and 
profit information in enforcing accountability at the micro- level of the individual 
contract. As a matter of routine, on the completion of contracts the Heads of 
Hawthorn Leslie’s three Departments each used data derived from the formal cost 
accounting system in order to provide the Board of Directors with a Report detailing 
comparisons of actual and estimated cost, together with explanations of cost 
differences (McLean, 2006, p.113).  
 
In exceptional circumstances, Rowell displayed his dissatisfaction with these data and 
with the system. When he presented a Report to the Board in 1901 on the ‘very 
unsatisfactory cost for the hull of the S.S. Canadian’ (DS.HL/1/13, p.137), Rowell 
undertook a fundamental critique of the data produced by the formal system. He noted 
that the formal cost accounting system reported a loss of £8,945 on the hull based on a 
price of £101,205. However, in order to portray financial reality as he saw it, Rowell 
made a series of adjustments not considered by the formal cost accounting system. He 
calculated the impact of: benefits resulting from terms of payments agreed with the 
owner, profits on internal shipyard transactions, the excess cost of additional 
overheads apportioned and the excess cost caused by using steel issue prices which 
were higher than actual purchase prices. Rowell insisted that his calculations showed 
the ‘True net cost’ and that, in fact, the loss on the hull was only £825 (DS.HL/1/13, 
pp.137 - 8). 
 
8 
 
In this instance, Rowell showed not only his facility for cost calculation but also 
demonstrated his knowledge of business practices not captured at the micro level of 
the individual contract by the formal cost accounting system and, in doing so, 
indicated his understanding of the consequences for cost and profit calculation of this 
system’s routine procedures. Furthermore he delivered his message to the Directors, 
the men at the very pinnacle of the firm, and left them in no doubt as to his view that 
the information produced by the formal cost accounting system was inadequate for 
purposes of managerial reporting while his own personal, engineering-based costing 
provided the ‘true’ picture on which managerial control should be based. 
Nevertheless, there is no evidence that Rowell continued in these efforts and, outside 
these exceptional circumstances, he continued to use accounting-based numbers in his 
Reports on contract costs, prices and profits.       
 
Reports for Directors’ Meetings also included analyses of work in progress and these 
reveal very different approaches to information preparation and analysis. Reports 
presented by the Heads of the Engine Works and the Locomotive Works were 
prepared by the firm’s Counting House and were couched in financial terms. 
However, as the Head of the Shipyard, Rowell always prepared his own Reports and 
always expressed them in physical terms (DS.HL/1/13, p.111). Similarly, in 
submitting proposals for capital expenditure to the Board of Directors, the Heads of 
the Engine Works and the Locomotive Works generally included a financial 
justification in their proposals while the Head of the Shipyard usually relied upon 
justifications based on improvements in technical efficiency and working practice. 
Thus, whether in relation to reporting on work in progress or on capital expenditure 
proposals, the Head of the Shipyard took an approach somewhat at variance with that 
of the other two engineers.  
 
However, such differences in approach are not unexpected. As noted by McLean 
(1996, p.122), general engineering and shipbuilding were very different industries. 
General engineering had long experience of control systems not suited to or adopted 
in the very different craft-controlled, non-standard product engineering environment 
of the shipbuilding industry. Nevertheless, the Heads of Hawthorn Leslie’s three 
departments were unanimous in support of the Company Secretary when in 1912 he  
‘proposed that a better system of reporting costs...should be introduced’. 
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Nevertheless, even though the ‘importance of the proposal was recognised 
unanimously by the Board, and it was considered several times eventually it was 
shelved, no explicit reason being given’ (McLean, 2006, p.113), although it may be 
noted that Hawthorn Leslie was always keen to avoid the fixed costs of clerical 
labour. However, the firm was willing to sanction new developments when these were 
felt necessary. In 1907, a new accounting-based system of capital expenditure 
reporting was instituted and in 1916 the new position of Company Treasurer was 
created (McLean, 2006, p.118). Thus, the development of a new costing system to 
provide management information was rather lower down Hawthorn Leslie’s list of 
priorities than were developments in the financial management of the firm.  
 
Nevertheless during this period Hawthorn Leslie Shipbuilders was a successful player 
in a very competitive, cyclical market and managed rapid change in the size and type 
of ship constructed, and in the materials, methods and workforce employed. Thus, in 
this dynamic shipbuilding environment, the directors of Hawthorn Leslie chose to 
operate formal contract accounting, costing and reporting systems which provided 
relatively little information for management and which they developed only to a very 
limited extent. Although in the shipyard craft control of the construction process did 
mitigate the need for the development of the costing system to some extent, 
nevertheless, the lack of formal management information in Hawthorn Leslie 
Shipbuilders is curious given the firm’s size, complexity, growth and success. The 
management information available was historic and focused internally. There was a 
complete lack of forecasting, planning and external market-based data. This lack 
points to either a gap in the information available in the firm or to a gap in our state of 
knowledge, or, perhaps, to both of these.  Accordingly, a search of the Hawthorn 
Leslie archive was undertaken. This revealed that, in fact, the apparent information 
gap was filled by Herbert Rowell’s informal and personal cost engineering system. 
Rowell’s cost engineering system consisted of significant personally-prepared data in 
the form of a memorandum book (DS.HL/5/1) and a series of pocket notebooks 
(DS.HL/5/2/1-15) containing costing and managerial analyses detailed for his own 
use. The contents of the memorandum book and the notebooks are analysed in the 
following section, after a consideration of the general arrangements and systems of 
cost engineering on the River Tyne. 
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6. Cost engineering  
 
6.1 Cost engineering on the River Tyne: general arrangements and systems 
 
Boyce (1995, p.362) notes that British shipowners of this period did not operate 
anonymously through market mechanisms or rely exclusively on management 
accounting systems for control purposes. Rather, they garnered information through 
inter-organisational and inter-personal networks and, in this context, exchanges were 
based on co-operation, personal reputation and trust. Boyce’s findings reflect the 
generally accepted view of how information was developed and exchanged between 
shipowners and also between shipowners and favoured shipbuilders (Pollard and 
Robertson, 1979) but this is not the accepted view of relationships between 
shipbuilder and shipbuilder. In their classic study of the British shipbuilding industry 
between 1870 and 1914, Pollard and Robertson (1979, p. 149) state that, 
 
                Despite the ties that grew from being associated in the same industry, (ship) 
                yard owners always regarded each other as competitors to whom it would  
                be foolhardy to give away any information unless something tangible could 
                be gained in return. 
 
However, the Transactions of the North East Coast Institution of Engineers and 
Shipbuilders (the Institution) present a rather different picture, revealing collaborative 
relationships within the shipbuilding industry, as well as pointing to key issues of 
concern in the business of shipbuilding. The Institution was founded in Newcastle 
Upon Tyne in 1884 during a period of rapid and fundamental technological, 
organisational and structural change in shipbuilding and marine engineering (Clarke, 
1984b). In this context, membership of the Institution grew to 452 in 1884 and 
averaged over 1,000 in the early 1900s (Clarke, 1984b, p.6). Membership was drawn 
from the industry’s owners, directors, engineers, shipbuilders, accountants and other 
professionals but throughout the current research period its senior officers and 
Presidents, including Rowell, were drawn solely from the very upper echelons of the 
industry. The objective of the Institution (Clarke, 1984b, p.5) was, 
 
                   The advancement of the science and practice of engineering and  
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                   shipbuilding, and the interchange of ideas and information among its 
                   members (italics added), by means of meetings for the reading and  
                   discussion of papers relating thereto, and placing on record its      
                   transactions (hereafter, Transactions). 
 
Despite some initial qualms (Transactions, Vol. 1, p.17), it is apparent that the papers 
and discussions represented a “very remarkable frankness in the exchange of detailed 
information” (Clarke, 1984b, p.60). Although many topics were  addressed in the 
Institution’s proceedings, key areas of concern to shipbuilders were highlighted 
(Transactions, Vol. 3, pp. 9-17) by W.T. Doxford, the Sunderland shipbuilder, during 
his 1886 inaugural address as President of the Institution, 
  
                            (Ship)owners . . have . . found that the larger a vessel is the better 
                            she will pay . . . Now, it is our duty as engineers and shipbuilders to  
                            assist this development by studying carefully the problems involved 
                            in the designing and construction of these enormous vessels and  
                            their engines and boilers ever bearing in mind the great desideratum  
                            that the cargo shall be taken in at one port, carried safely to, and  
                            discharged at the other, at the lowest possible cost per ton.    
 
That these were indeed major areas of key concern to shipbuilders during the research 
period is apparent from the papers on ship design and construction and ship operating 
costs presented at the Institution. However, although there was a free exchange of 
information on shipbuilding contract accounting and costing systems in the national 
literature (e.g. Bruce, 1911; Burton, 1900; Plumpton, 1895), only a limited number of 
papers on systems and methods of management, cost engineering, costing and 
accounting was presented at the Institution. Thus, when Rowell discussed costing and 
estimating during a Presidential address to the Institution (Transactions, Vol. 33, pp. 
89-90) he made clear his view that ‘with regard to methods and systems of cost-
keeping . . . there was far too much secrecy’ and he encouraged greater openness and 
sharing of information. 
 
Overall, it is apparent that during the research period the Institution worked towards   
its objective of “the interchange of ideas and information among its members” 
12 
 
(Clarke, 1984b, p.5). In part this was done by the presentation of papers and debates 
and the reproduction of these in the Transactions and, additionally, by visits to 
examine the operations of various shipyards at home (e.g. Transactions, Vol.16, 
p.101; Vol.17, p.1) and abroad (e.g. Transactions, Vol.29, p.343). Thus, the Institution 
promoted cooperation within the industry and provided a formal, public arena to 
inform the working lives of members such as Rowell. Generally, there was a 
remarkable openness in the sharing of technical information, but information that had 
a direct bearing on the commercial, managerial or financial aspects of the 
shipbuilding industry was much more closely guarded in this public forum.  
 
By the late-nineteenth century engineers had exploited their specialist knowledge and 
skills base and had taken over from shipwrights as the dominant professional 
grouping in shipyard management. In this powerful position they understood, 
accepted and derived benefit from the traditional industry practice of craft control of 
the construction process and, moreover, they may ‘have had a politically and socially 
grounded commitment to uphold the independence of skilled labour within the 
capitalist system’ (McLean, 1996, p.130). Thus, in this context, the development of 
accounting-based labour control systems was precluded. When formal costing 
systems were required, shipbuilders used and promoted those of engineering rather 
than of accounting design. Shipbuilders employed ‘‘alternative’, non-accounting 
measurement systems such as cost curves’ (McLean and Tyson, 2006, p.413) in 
providing estimated and actual data for the planning and control of construction costs, 
work-loads and time-lines. These arrangements and systems served to ensure that, 
generally on the River Tyne, formal costing development was engineering rather than 
accounting-based in the areas of operational planning and control. The specific cost 
engineering system developed by Herbert Rowell in Hawthorn Leslie is examined 
next.  
 
6.2 Rowell’s cost engineering 
 
Rowell’s cost engineering data and information are gathered in his personal, hand-
written memorandum book and pocket notebooks. The one memorandum book 
surviving in the archive is neatly written, well presented and contains very full 
coverage of matters of business importance to Rowell. With regard to the notebooks, 
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the legibility of the text is variable; some analyses are clearly written and presented 
while others are less so. The memorandum book covers the period from August 1897 
to August 1899 and the notebooks are dated in the period 1901 – 1915, although there 
are gaps for 1908, 1910 -11 and 1913. Sometimes pages are numbered and at other 
times they remain un-numbered. The surviving archive of Rowell’s notebooks is thus  
incomplete and it is possible that the memorandum book archive is also incomplete. 
The surviving documentation is analysed in two sub-sections. The first deals with cost 
management and the second considers cost estimation, pricing and tendering. This 
form of analysis is in line with Rowell’s view of his priorities and the appropriate 
measures of his performance. When re-negotiating his personal contract with 
Hawthorn Leslie in 1895, Rowell argued that his bonuses ‘should be governed by the 
accuracy of my estimates and the economy of my work’ (Clarke, no date, p.51). 
 
6.2.1 Cost management 
 
Using his own experience together with data from within Hawthorn Leslie and 
knowledge derived from personal contacts within shipbuilding, Rowell could 
understand and analyse cost structures in ways that were different to the formal 
contract accounting and costing system. Downturns in demand for ships, such as that 
which led to the Amalgamation Movement of the 1880s (Appendix A) caused a 
downward pressure on wage rates. However, increases in demand and an increasingly 
politicised workforce (Appendix A) caused an upward pressure on wage rates. For 
example, in 1899 (DS.HL/1/13, pp. 24-27), Rowell was able to attribute increased 
labour costs to the widespread, 
 
                    abuse of the piece rate and even of the time rate system. Inducements are  
                    held out to men to leave their employment in numerous ways, such as . . . 
                    counting 70 or 80 rivets to the 100 and thus evading the agreed piece     
                    rates. Time and a quarter is also said to be paid for ordinary work as well  
                    as piece rates for time work. Abuses like these once established can never  
                    be completely got rid of, and explain fully the recent disproportionate  
                    increases in labour costs in certain yards. 
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Rowell made particular use of his industry contacts during a time of crisis in 1900-
1902 when there was an ongoing debate within Hawthorn Leslie of a proposal to sell 
off the shipyard. This debate, which was driven by Hawthorn Leslie’s accounting 
numbers and was based on the Directors’ perception of the shipyard’s lack of 
profitability, resulted in an investigation by a Special Committee consisting of the 
firm’s auditors and its Finance Committee (McLean, 2006). However, in order to gain 
further insights into the shipyard’s position, in December 1901 Rowell visited the 
River Clyde and engaged in frank exchanges of detailed information with other 
shipbuilders (DS.HL/5/2/1). Table 1 indicates that, despite Pollard and Robertson’s 
(1979, p.149) views on the unwillingness of shipbuilders to share information with 
one another, Rowell was able to obtain much knowledge from the Clyde shipbuilders 
on normally highly confidential matters such as actual and estimated ship construction 
costs and product mix decisions (Table 1), together with cost estimating methods, 
labour cost analysis,  
                        
                                                 TABLE 1 
 
piecework systems, overhead costing methods, cost recording systems and product 
mix decisions. This gathering of knowledge underpinned Rowell’s stance in the 
debate on the proposed sale of the shipyard. Although the Special Committee was not 
able to provide any explanation of the apparent under-performance of the shipyard, 
Rowell was able to state firmly (DS.HL/5/2/1) that ‘Visit confirms my view that our 
labour is present cause of our not paying’. Armed with insights derived from his visits 
to River Clyde shipyards, Rowell addressed his Board of Directors and argued 
successfully against the proposal to sell off the Hawthorn Leslie shipyard. 
 
As part of the information exchange with River Clyde shipbuilders, Rowell noted the 
disparity between engineers’ ship cost calculations and the ‘accountants basis’ 
(DS.HL/5/2/1), thus confirming the differing approaches of the two professions to this 
key managerial area. This visit also gave Rowell insight into shipyard fraud and 
embezzlement, its impact on ship costs and the counter-measures to be taken by 
engineers rather than accountants. He noted (DS.HL/5/2/1), 
 
                 Recent case at Rumages (Shipyard) – their foremen check paysheets for  
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                 piece(work) before pay is made up - & clerk altered figures afterwards -    
                 instance on which he was caught . . 117 rivets passed as covered and he  
                 put a ‘1’ in front making 1,117 rivets & took the money for the 1,000 from 
                 the paytin – Ward (of Denny & Co) thinks excess (cost) for riveting on  
                 (Hawthorn Leslie Ship Number) 380 may be due to this & recommends     
                  analyse quantity of rivets put in by foremen & paid for and check from 
                 ship or plans. (Now, at Denny & Co) Foremen fix no piece rates – Jackson  
                 (the shipyard manager) fixes all new rates and checks all repeat ones & all   
                 new ones are presented to office to Ward.   
 
The visits to River Clyde shipbuilders in December 1901, undertaken in a time of 
crisis, represent the only extensive and detailed instances of information exchange 
with other shipbuilders recorded in Rowell’s documentation during the period 1897-
1915. In that sense, these visits are exceptional. However the visits may also be 
regarded as particular instances of Rowell’s practice of gathering and analysing cost 
management data relating to his operational responsibilities from sources both within 
and, particularly, from outside Hawthorn Leslie throughout this period. 
 
The efficient organisation of supplies underpinned the success of British shipbuilding 
(Pollard and Robertson, 1979, p. 89). Rowell paid particular attention to analysing the 
comparative costs of engines and boilers to be purchased from various suppliers, 
including Hawthorn Leslie’s own Engine Works (DS.HL/5/2/3) and (DS.HL/5/2/11), 
indicating that the shipyard was not simply a captive market for the Engine Works. 
On a ship-by-ship basis he compared engine cost quotations from the Engine Works 
and ‘outside’ suppliers (DS.HL/5/2/8) and used his knowledge of Hawthorn Leslie’s 
Engine Works costs to compare engine costs with ‘charges’ (i.e overhead costs) at 
one-half and one-third of their normal levels (DS.HL/5/27). When considering steel, 
timber and other supplies, Rowell analysed not only stocks in hand (DS.HL/5/2/11; 
DS.HL/5/2/9), contract quantities and prices (DS.HL/5/2/4; DS.HL/5/2/7; 
DS.HL/5/2/9; DS.HL/5/2/15)), but also brought into play his knowledge of the 
industry and imposed his own standards. For example, Rowell noted  (Rowell, 1996, 
p. 22) the counter-measures he took when the Steel Company of Scotland tried to 
deceive him: ‘The Steel Company of Scotland, where castings were made, had a very 
dishonest testing room and trained the lads to call out false figures when measuring 
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test pieces, and showed resentment when I took all my own observations (in order to 
thwart the company’s attempts to deceive me)’. 
 
In conjunction with his organisation of supplies, Rowell prepared information to help 
him in the planning and control of shipyard activities. He employed planned and 
actual ship construction work schedules and time lines, noting: starting dates; dates at 
various stages of the construction process; completion dates; and dates of sea trials  
(DS.HL/5/2/4; DS.HL/5/2/6; DS.HL/5/2/7). On a ship-by-ship basis, he noted 
delivery dates and material and labour costs ‘spent’ and ‘to spend’ during the 
construction process (DS.HL/5/2/9) and month-by-month costs incurred 
(DS.HL/5/2/15). Furthermore, he presented detailed analyses of estimated cost, price 
and profit for later comparison with actual results (DS.HL/5/2/9) and constructed 
schedules of total cost and cost per ton of steel and various labour categories 
(DS.HL/5/2/7). Rowell did not take cost calculation methods as a matter of course but 
took a great interest in methods of overhead costing, paying great attention to the 
overhead ‘charges’ to be included in ships’ costs. He discussed the calculation of 
‘charges’ as a percentage of labour cost + material cost and noted Denny & Co’s 
method of calculating a ‘charges’ percentage (DS.HL/5/2/8). Rowell was particularly 
concerned with ‘charges’ during downturns in the industry and showed some 
flexibility in amounts included in ships’ costs. In 1904, he noted that there were 179 
shipbuilding berths on the River Tyne and that only 77 were occupied (DS.HL/5/2/6). 
On repair work, he noted that applying ‘charges’ at the rate of 50% on direct labour 
does not cover us . . unless very busy –If slack as now we require 56%.’ 
(DS.HL/5/2/7) and compared the ‘charges’ element in the cost-plus pricing methods 
allowable by the Admiralty and others (DS.HL/5/2/12).  
 
Similarly, Rowell also used comparative, external data when analysing and examining 
the wages of shipyard workers. In 1905-06 (DS.HL/5/2/9), he gathered data from five 
firms on the wage rates of fitters, a particular group of tradesmen, and recorded that 
the ‘standard rate’, including an ‘advance due’, varied between 36/- and 38/6 per 
week although this could be increased by allowances for factors such as ‘dirty 
money’. Furthermore, he listed and compared ‘average wages’ of workers in 
Hawthorn Leslie’s three departments for 1913 and 1914 (DS.HL/5/2/15). Rowell 
recorded (DS.HL/5/2/10) the ratio of apprentice boilermakers to tradesmen in nine 
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different shipbuilding areas of Great Britain. Although not stated explicitly in his 
notebook, Rowell’s concern was probably the perceived cost advantage of employing 
a high proportion of apprentices rather than with their training per se. As comparators 
with Hawthorn Leslie costs, Rowell obtained detailed analyses of other shipbuilders’ 
labour and engine costs (DS.HL/5/2/7) and their estimated material and labour costs 
on ships tendered for (DS.HL/5/2/6).  
 
Although ship operating costs were crucial to customers, there is little evidence in 
Rowell’s documentation that he devoted a great deal of effort to the preparation of  
costings dealing explicitly with this matter, his calculations of the ship coal 
consumption costs of Hawthorn Leslie ships (DS.HL/5/2/3) and (DS.HL/5/2/12) 
being rather isolated examples. It is possible that the lack of ship operating cost data 
may be explained by the fact that such matters were dealt with in technical 
documentation no longer extant. Similarly, Rowell’s notebooks contain very little 
reference to capital expenditure and shipyard operating costs. However, he did 
compile (DS.HL/5/2/10) an analysis of ‘Capital Expenditure 1906-7’ for all three of 
Hawthorn Leslie’s departments: the Shipyard, Engine Works and Locomotive Works. 
Furthermore, he prepared cost statements dealing with alternative proposals for the 
‘electrification’ of the shipyard (DS.HL/5/2//3) and noted electricity costs per unit 
consumed (DS.HL/5/2/9). Rowell prepared analyses of work in progress and capital 
expenditure proposals in technical rather than in financial terms and this may explain 
the lack of relevant financial data in his notebooks. 
 
6.2.2 Cost estimation, pricing and tendering 
 
Rowell was assiduous in cultivating connections not only with shipbuilders but, 
particularly, also with shipowners. His memorandum book and his notebooks are 
replete with information derived from contacts at home and from his business trips to 
France, Germany, Italy, North Africa, Greece, Turkey, Russia and Canada 
(DS.HL/5/1; DS.HL/5/2/1; DS.HL/5/2/3; DS.HL/5/2/4; DS.HL/5/2/12). In the process 
of cost estimation, pricing and tendering, Rowell drew on this externally sourced 
information and also on Hawthorn Leslie’s formal costing system. This system 
incorporated Cost Books (DS.HL/4/10) containing memorandum historic cost records 
for each ship built. On a ship-by ship basis, each record includes: a calculation of total 
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cost, analysed by expense heading; analyses of materials and labour costs per ton; 
detailed analyses of labour costs by trade and by mode of payment, whether time-
work or piece-work. A study of Rowell’s documentation indicates that he used the 
formal costing system as a database but re-worked, adapted, extended or ignored these 
data in preparing cost estimates when tendering for new contracts.  
 
However, in the period up to 1914, the price of ships was influenced more by demand 
side factors, such as freight-rates, than by supply side cost structures (Pollard and 
Robertson, 1979). In addition to his knowledge of Hawthorn Leslie’s pricing, Rowell 
gathered pricing and other market-based information both from shipbuilders and 
shipowners. All of his documentation indicates the importance that Rowell placed on 
the tendering process. He obtained detailed data on competitors’ ship design, 
specification, construction cost, operating cost and tender price and compared these 
with data on Hawthorn Leslie ships (e.g. DS.HL/5/2/11).  Table 2 is a summary of the 
many cost engineering entries in Rowell’s memorandum book for 1897 – 1899 
(DS.HL/5/1). This table indicates that Rowell’s prime emphasis in cost engineering 
lay in the field of cost estimation, pricing and tendering. As noted by Table 2, the vast 
bulk of his analyses dealt with the estimation of ships’ costs and the subsequent 
careful consideration of tender details and contract prices. The final item in Table 2 is 
a summary of the entries in page 210 of the memorandum book and deals with the 
‘Comparison of tender prices of various shipbuilders for the building of the same 
ships’. The full detail of this item is presented in Table 3.   
                                          
                                         INSERT TABLE 2 
  
                                         INSERT TABLE 3 
 
Table 3 records data communicated to Rowell by a shipowner, A.L. Alliman, in 
November 1899. These data list tender prices submitted to Alliman by fourteen 
different shipbuilders, including Hawthorn Leslie, for five different types of ship. 
Rowell was able to use these data to compare Hawthorn Leslie’s tender prices with 
those of other shipbuilders over a range of ships. Thus in the pricing decision, 
Rowell’s cost data were much enhanced by an understanding of the market place and 
of shipowners’ requirements and competitors’ costs and prices.  
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In Hawthorn Leslie, some invitations from shipowners to tender for the construction 
of a new ship were dealt with as a matter of organisational routine: same day 
responses were supplied on pre-printed forms, the tender price being written into the 
appropriate space on the form (DS.HL/4/1). However, other invitations to tender were 
dealt with in detail by Rowell; often the shipowner would supply only the barest of 
details as to his requirements and Rowell would then determine the physical 
dimensions and technical capabilities of the ship before building up a cost estimate 
and determining a tender price (Figure 1).  
 
                                      INSERT FIGURE 1 
 
At times, this entire process would go through several iterations as Rowell sought to 
come to a pricing decision. As Pollard and Robertson (1979, p.103) comment, ‘The 
decision to be made by the builder might be a very delicate one. He had to balance the 
divergent claims of quality and cheapness, speed and safety, reliability and 
innovation. He had to bear in mind the tenders of other builders, which induced him 
to lower his standards and prices, but also his future reputation, which induced him to 
raise them. With these and a number of other considerations in mind, such as the 
delivery date, the tender would finally be made.’  
 
Rowell expended enormous effort in preparing cost estimates as part of the tendering 
process. They are the major focus of the memorandum book and all of the notebooks. 
As indicated above, it appears that his response to an important or technically 
challenging invitation to tender was to determine himself the physical and technical 
specification of the ship as required to meet the owner’s operational requirements, 
prepare a cost estimate and then base a tender price on that estimate and his 
knowledge of the market. It is apparent that, to Rowell, this response was obvious, 
natural and necessary. However, the historian may wonder what it actually 
accomplished and what purpose it actually served. From Table 3 and other instances 
(e.g. DS.HL/5/2/15) it may be noted that, at times, there were huge variations in the 
prices quoted by different shipbuilders for the same ship. Also, for example, it may be 
seen in Table 4 that Rowell has noted beside his price quotation that the ‘order was 
placed for a good deal less’ with another shipbuilder. Such differences between 
shipbuilders’ price quotations may be explained by differences in cost, cost estimation 
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methods and market assessments and also by the fact that shipbuilders would make a 
particularly high bid when, in fact, they did not really wish to be awarded the contract. 
Nevertheless, on other occasions shipbuilders’ price quotations were grouped rather 
more closely. It is probable that, even if flawed, the process of cost estimation and the 
application of market intelligence provided Rowell with a means of dealing with the 
uncertainty and complexity of the competitive bidding process, although his success 
rate cannot be ascertained from the available data.    
 
Pollard and Robertson (1979, p.93) note that close links between shipowners and 
shipbuilders were a great strength of the British shipbuilding industry as they 
provided an element of continuity in orders and some standardisation in design. 
Rowell’s contacts with shipowners were crucial to the success of the Hawthorn Leslie 
shipyard. Between 1899 and 1914, Hawthorn Leslie constructed 102 ships totalling 
408,000 tons. Of these, five commercial shipping lines contracted for 38 ships 
totalling 220,000 tons (Clarke, n.d., p.67) while the British Admiralty contracted for 
27 ships totalling c. 16,500 tons (ibid, p.112). Thus 58 per cent of Hawthorn Leslie’s 
tonnage was constructed for only six major customers.  
 
Often, Hawthorn Leslie did have to engage in a bidding process with other 
shipbuilders when competing for contracts from these customers. However there are 
instances (e.g. DS.HL/5/2/4) when the Hawthorn Leslie bid was the highest price and 
the firm still gained the contract, perhaps indicating the strength of the relationship 
between builder and owner. At times a customer required a series of ships of the same 
design, and then Rowell prepared a detailed cost estimate of the first ship before 
making rule-of-thumb reductions in the cost estimates of further ships. He then  
calculated an average estimated cost per ship and used this as a basis for determining 
an average ship price to be quoted in the tender (e.g. DS.HL/5/2/9). In order to remain 
competitive during downturns in the market, Rowell would base his estimated 
‘charges’ on one-half and at times one-third of the normal rate in an effort to quote 
competitive prices (DS.HL/5/2/4).  
 
Moreover, as part of the process of building and maintaining good relationships with 
shipowners, Rowell played a role in helping them to decide how they would finance 
the purchase of ships. He noted the use of bills of exchange for payment by 
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instalments (DS.HL/5/2/4) and financing by the issue of debentures (e.g. 
DS.HL/5/2/2). Additionally, he documented how a shipowner had awarded a contract 
to a competitor shipbuilder, requiring the builder to take part-ownership of the ship in 
return for ‘all earnings over 5% net until he is paid off & of course (the builder) gets 
interest on the unpaid balance @ 1% over bank rate’ (DS.HL/5/2/4).  
 
Furthermore, Rowell also documented some of the realities of commercial life that 
were not recorded openly in either the contract accounting system or the costing 
system. For example, the ‘commissions’ paid to the representatives of foreign 
governments during the process of tendering for warships and the fact that an 
influential overseas figure ‘goes to England twice a year & likes being entertained’, 
together with the knowledge that one particular superintending engineer is a ‘man 
who would be entertained & the other a poor one who would like something’ 
(DS.HL/5/2/5). However, obtaining a contract was simply part of the shipbuilder’s 
relationship with the owner. Owners often changed their requirements during the 
construction process and, because the craft control of the construction process built 
adaptability and flexibility into the system, British shipbuilders could deal with these 
changes more easily than their overseas competitors who relied upon capital intensive 
construction methods (McLean, 1996, p.125). Rowell dealt with these changes in his 
cost estimation and pricing by calculating the impact of the ‘extras’ required by them 
(e.g. DS.HL/5/2/3; DS.HL/5/2/4; DS.HL/5/2/7; DS.HL/5/2/9; DS.HL/5/2/12).  
 
The constant gathering of market intelligence is a feature that runs throughout all of 
Rowell’s documentation. He monitored the costs and prices of other shipbuilders 
(DS.HL/5/2/12; DS.HL/5/1/15) and, based on his knowledge of the market, he 
pursued business and prepared cost estimates and price quotations in diverse areas of 
business including the Canadian Great Lakes (DS.HL/5/2/3), the New Zealand and 
Australian sheep trade (DS.HL/5/2/2; DS.HL/5/2/10), Finnish icebreakers 
(DS.HL/5/2/10) and Turkish warships (DS.HL/5/2/15).  
 
Rowell paid particular attention to the gathering of market intelligence on Admiralty 
work. Such work was prestigious and profitable and Rowell took pains to gather data 
to help him in the pursuit of this business. He compared other shipbuilders’ quotes for 
battleships and noted that they would be able to cover all ‘charges’ and make high 
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profits (DS.HL/5/2/6). Furthermore, he recorded data from a Parliamentary report on 
the performance of destroyers of different shipbuilders and compared these with data 
on Hawthorn Leslie-built destroyers. In his search for market intelligence, he prepared 
an analysis from the ‘Globe’ newspaper and  noted  the tonnage and cost of warships, 
excluding submarines and torpedo boats, constructed over a five year period  in Great 
Britain, Russia, Germany, France and the United States (DS.HL/5/2/8).  However, 
while gathering market-based information, Rowell did not neglect to collect relevant 
data from within Hawthorn Leslie and noted sea trials data on Hawthorn Leslie 
warships for the Admiralty (DS.HL/5/2/8) 
 
In analysing Hawthorn Leslie’s position in the competitive market for the building of 
British warships, Rowell observed that the ‘Government is committed to the country 
to build 33 knotters & if we object they will approach others’ (DS.HL/5/2/8). In 
pursuit of warship business, he recorded details of other shipbuilders’ estimated costs 
of alternative designs of destroyers (DS.HL/5/2/12). In relation to Admiralty work, as 
with all other business, Rowell took care to keep in touch with developments in the 
market place in order to facilitate his own journey through the tendering process. For 
example, he kept abreast of changing markets for warships (DS.HL5/2/8) and noted 
prices quoted by other shipbuilders (DS.HL/5/2/15). In one instance he recorded that 
HMS Invincible was under construction at Armstrong’s shipyard in Newcastle 
(DS.HL/5/2/10), Armstrong’s having submitted a tender price of £483,508 against 
Fairfield’s £438,495 and Clydebank’s £435,754. Rowell noted that the ship delivered 
41,000 Indicated Horse Power (IHP) which equalled ‘about £10 - £12 per IHP’ and 
given that the Admiralty wished to obtain tenders for new Dreadnoughts of 23,000 
IHP he calculated that an approximate price would be £270,000. Rowell sought not 
only to build new ships for the Admiralty, but also sought repair work for which he 
placed cost-plus bids (e.g. DS.HL/5/2/12). 
 
6.2.3 Rowell’s inter-organisational relationships and cost engineering  
 
Rowell’s inter-organisational relationships were fundamental to his cost management 
and his cost estimation, pricing and tendering. These relationships posed management 
control and cost engineering problems beyond those encountered within Hawthorn 
Leslie itself. Three approaches to the control of such inter-organisational relationships 
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have been identified: outcome controls, behaviour controls and social controls (Kraus 
and Lind, 2007).  
Outcome controls measure the results of inter-organisational relationships and 
determine appropriate evaluations and rewards, often on the basis of accounting 
measures (Dekker, 2004). However, Rowell’s cost engineering system did not operate 
in this formal and structured manner but relied instead on behavioural and social 
controls. Behaviour controls specify how parties within an inter-organisational 
relationship should act and then evaluate whether or not the specified behaviour has 
been adhered to.  Thus, as noted above in relation to Rowell’s cost management, 
Rowell and other shipbuilders were parties to the setting of ‘agreed piece rates’.  
Then, Rowell monitored the actual practice of other shipbuilders and found ‘abuse of 
the piece rate and even of the time rate system’ (DS.HL/1/13, pp. 24-27). On the basis 
of this information, Rowell was then able to ‘explain fully the recent disproportionate 
increases in labour costs in certain yards’ (DS.HL/1/13, pp. 24-27). 
Such behavioural feedback had implications for the use of social controls, that is ‘the 
values, norms and culture that influence the behaviour of people in companies’ (Kraus 
and Lind, 2007, p. 280). Trust is fundamental to social control. In an inter-
organisational relationship, trust may be viewed as the expectation that all parties will 
behave in a predictable and acceptable manner (Sako, 1992). The greater the level of 
trust, the less need there is for the more formal and expensive outcome and behaviour 
controls. However, where agreements are abused or flouted then, of course, trust is 
diminished. At this point, firms must consider the intensity of their inter-
organisational relationships and determine which should be close and which should be 
more distant. The intensity of the relationship determines the amount of information 
to be divulged (Kraus and Lind, 2007). Thus Rowell engaged in very free and frank 
information with River Clyde shipbuilders but was more guarded in his dealings with 
shipbuilders in the North East of England. Similarly, Rowell developed relationships 
of trust with the five commercial shipping lines which became his major clients and 
engaged in freer information exchange with them than with other clients.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Operating in a context of industrial, organisational and environmental change, the 
British shipbuilding industry of the late nineteenth-early twentieth centuries was 
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successful in its management of complexity, uncertainty and risk. During this period, 
Great Britain became the world’s leading shipbuilding nation (Jones, 1957) and 
Hawthorn Leslie became one of the country’s ‘important shipbuilders’ (Pollard and 
Robertson, 1979, p.51).  
 
Hawthorn Leslie Shipbuilders employed separate formal systems of contract 
accounting, costing and reporting for directors. These systems measured and reported 
the profit performance of the shipyard, enabled the operation of a managerial bonus 
scheme  together with the enforcement of managerial accountability on a contract-by-
contract basis, and provided ships’ historic cost data. Additionally, Herbert Rowell 
had access to shipbuilders’ general cost engineering arrangements and systems which 
provided information for operational planning and control. Nevertheless, overall, 
there was an apparent shortfall in the information required to manage Hawthorn 
Leslie Shipbuilders during this period of rapid organisational and technological 
change in a cyclical and very competitive market place. In fact, this apparent 
information gap was filled by Rowell’s informal and personal cost engineering 
system. In this system, Rowell gathered data from external sources and used these 
together with internal data to develop sets of information for cost management and for 
cost estimation, pricing and tendering. Thus, in Hawthorn Leslie Shipbuilders 
engineers and accountants were not ‘fighting for turf’ (Boyns and Edwards, 2007, 
p.980) in a war of the professions; rather, cost engineering and costing served very 
different functions and developed in two separate spheres and on two different 
trajectories. Hawthorn Leslie Shipbuilders offers further opportunities as a research 
site for the study of costing and cost engineering, particularly in the field of labour 
cost management and behavioural accounting. 
 
Through to the twenty-first century, cost engineering has continued to develop along 
its own professional route, focusing on cost estimation, cost control and profitability, 
often in relation to large-scale capital projects. National professional bodies, such as 
the UK’s Association of Cost Engineers and the American Association of Cost 
Engineers, together with the International Cost Engineering Council and university 
cost engineering programmes (e.g. Cranfield University, 2010) have been key 
elements in the development of the profession. Cost engineering has been neglected in 
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studies of costing within the accounting literature and it is recommended that future 
research should seek to remedy this neglect.  
 
Note 1 
J.F. Clarke is the author of a history of Hawthorn Leslie entitled ‘Power on Land and 
Sea’. This book was published by Hawthorn Engineers Ltd but, unfortunately, no 
publication date is available. 
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Appendix A: Hawthorn Leslie in context 
Timeline 
1817   R. & W. Hawthorn engineering partnership formed 
1853   A. Leslie’s shipyard opened 
1869   Opening of the Suez Canal, reducing voyage time between Europe and    
           Australia, New Zealand and the East 
1876   Queen Victoria declared as Empress of India 
1880 – 1889 The Amalgamation Movement in shipbuilding, marine engineering and 
           shipowning  
1880   Education Act. School attendance compulsory for children aged 5 – 10 
1880 - 1881   First Boer War 
1883   Extension of Married Women’s Property Act of 1870 
1884 – 1885   European Partition of West Africa 
1884   Fabian Society formed  
1884   Third Reform Act extends male franchise 
1886   Formation of R. & W. Hawthorn Leslie & Co Ltd 
1888   Wilhelm II becomes Emperor of Germany 
1892   Keir Hardie elected as MP 
1893   Independent Labour Party formed 
1897   Merger of women’s suffrage groups to form National Union of Women’s 
           Suffrage Societies 
1899 – 1902 Second Boer War 
1900   Arms race between Great Britain and Germany begins 
1900   Boxer Rebellion in China 
1902   Anglo Japanese Treaty 
1904   Entente Cordiale between France and Great Britain 
1904   John Fisher appointed as First Lord of the Admiralty; begins process of reform 
           and warship construction 
1904 – 1905 Japan victorious in Russo-Japanese War 
1906    First dreadnought battleship 
1907    Triple Entente between France, Great Britain and Russia 
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1908    State pension introduced for people aged over 70 
1911    National Insurance Act provides benefits for workers in times of sickness 
1911    Parliament Act limits power of House of Lords 
1912    Sinking of the ‘Titanic’ 
1914    Outbreak of World War 1 
Monarchs 
Queen Victoria, 1837 – 1901 
King Edward VII, 1901 – 1910 
King George V, 1910 – 1936 
Main political leaders  
W.E. Gladstone, Liberal, Prime Minister: 1868 – 1874, 1880 – 1886, 1892 – 1894 
B. Disraeli, Conservative, Prime Minister: 1874 – 1880 
Lord Salisbury, Conservative, Prime Minister: 1885, 1886 – 1892, 1895 – 1902 
W. Asquith, Liberal, Prime Minister: 1908 – 1916. 
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Table 1: Information obtained by Rowell during visits to River Clyde shipbuilders 
 
Wages                      Christie’s ship                       Hawthorn Leslie ship ‘Kingstonian’ 
 
                                                                                   Weight 3,804 tons     If 
                                                                                   includes 60t too    3,864tons 
                                                                                   little for rivets      
Platers & A.I.S. (£)7,514 (£)2.  0.  2(per ton) £7,533 1.19.  8 1.19.  1         
Rivetters     6,656     1. 15.  6   6,646 1.14.10 1.14.  4 
Caulkers     1,892         10.  1   2,098    11.  0    10.10  
Drillers     1,670           8.11        1,847      9.  9      9.  7 
   17,732     4. 14.  8 18,124 4.15.  3 4.13.10 
15% off as our wt. heavier           1.111/2     
      4. 13.  81/2     
 
Christie considers their cost a very bad one & attributes it to demoralisation by . . . 
heavy inspection. also to time vessel took to build, 14 months, but says this latter was 
a cause of them doing so badly on her. Result of last few years inflation in his opinion 
shows that on a rising market & under such exceptional labour conditions the right 
thing to do is to build moderate sized, plain vessels with as little special work as 
possible so as to get it rapidly out, & see how things are going as many times in the 
year as possible . . . .  
 
They have built a series of similar boats about 2,600 tons . . their average cost of the 
lab(our) on our basis is about (£) 3-10-0 for five built in normal times & the average 
of 3 built in 1900-1 is 15% above what it should have been on accountants basis i.e. 
30% up instead of 15%.  
 
 
Source: transcribed and extracted from DS.HL/5/2/1 
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Table 2: Analysis of Rowell’s memorandum book, 1897-1899:  
               cost estimation, pricing and tendering  
  
DS.HL/5/1  Memorandum Book 
Page no. Description of entry 
 (Note: HL = Hawthorn Leslie) 
  
 9 Comparisons of estimates of various shipbuilders for icebreakers 
10 HL ship cost estimate 
19 HL screw trawler cost estimate, labour, materials and overheads 
20 HL ship cost estimate 
21 Specification, cost and payment terms of ship built by Palmer for Elder 
Dempster 
63 Updating of costs of HL ‘Canadian’ ships under construction as basis for 
re-negotiation of contract price 
67-68 HL torpedo boats cost estimate 
75 Comparison of tender prices and construction time estimates, HL, 
Palmer and Edwards 
84 Cost estimate and price quotation for Wm. Johnston & Co., Liverpool 
86 Comparison of HL and Palmer estimated prices for building same ship 
for Wm. Johnston & Co., Liverpool 
94 Comparison of estimated prices for building same ship by HL, Scott of 
Greenock, Philipson of N. Ireland, Swan Hunter 
107 Details of Palmer’s quote for the ship ‘Viper’ built for Parsons and 
Palmer’s negotiations with Parsons regarding price 
109 Detailed specification and cost of ship built by Palmer 
110-119,  
125-128, 
133-139 
Negotiations with shipowner on ship specification, cost and price of ship 
to be built by HL 
156 HL ship cost estimate 
183 Comparison of estimated prices of various shipbuilders for building the 
same ship 
190 Comparison of HL and Denny ship specifications and price estimates for 
30 
 
a contract won by Denny 
193 HL ship cost estimate for new ship: based on historic cost for previous 
similar ship, adjusted for changed specification 
210 Comparison of tender prices of various shipbuilders for the building of 
the same ships 
 
 
 
Source: transcribed and extracted from DS.HL/5/1 
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Table 3: Comparative tender prices: information received from  
               A.L.Alliman, shipowner, 25 November 1899 
 
 
Shipbuilder Ship Type A Ship Type B Ship Type C Ship Type D 
     
Richardson £65,250 £42,700 £43,500 £43,500 
Dobson   70,000   46,500   48,200   48,000 
Armstrong   75,000   55,000        -        - 
Howaldswerke   74,500   46,000   48,900   49,900 
London&Glasgow   76,000   46,200   49,500   49,200 
Denny   77,000        -        -        - 
Hawthorn Leslie   80,300   49,500   58,100        - 
Greenoak   81,300   53,800        -        - 
Earles   88,500   52,500   58,000   55,350 
Clydebank   93,000   58,500   61,800   63,350 
Palmers   96,000   54,000   58,500   68,900 
Swan Hunter        -   53,000        -        - 
Fairfield        -   60,800        -   68,900    
Burmeister&Wain        -        -   53,890   55,500 
 
 
 
Source: transcribed and extracted from DS.HL/5/1, p. 210 
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Figure 1: Cost estimate and price quotation 
 
Source: DS.HL/l/5/1 
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